No. 21-1333 · decided May 18, 2023 · 598 U. S. 617
Gonzalez v. Google LLC
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Syllabus
Prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader; it is no part of the opinion of the Court.
In 2015, Nohemi Gonzalez, a U. S. citizen, was killed in a set of coordinated terrorist attacks carried out across Paris, France, under the direction of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Gonzalez’s parents and brothers sued Google LLC under 18 U. S. C. § 2333(a) and (d)(2), alleging that Google was both directly and secondarily liable for the terrorist attack that killed Gonzalez. With regard to their secondary-liability claims under § 2333(d)(2), plaintiffs alleged that Google aided and abetted and conspired with ISIS through ISIS’ use of YouTube, which Google owns and operates. The District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim, though it offered plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. Plaintiffs opted to appeal, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a consolidated opinion that the Court also addressed in Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U. S. 471. With regard to this case, the Ninth Circuit held that most of plaintiffs’ claims were barred by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. The sole exceptions were claims based on allegations that YouTube maintained a revenue-sharing system through which Google approved ISIS videos and shared revenue with ISIS; however, the court held that those allegations failed to state a viable claim in any event. Plaintiffs sought review in this Court of the Ninth Circuit’s application of § 230 but not of that court’s holdings regarding the revenue-sharing claims.
Held: The Court declines to address the application of § 230 to a complaint that appears to state little, if any, plausible claim for relief. The secondary-liability claims here are materially identical to those in the Twitter plaintiffs’ complaint, and thus it appears to follow from the holding of that case that the complaint here fails to state a claim for aiding and abetting under § 2333(d)(2). The remainder of plaintiffs’ claims here may be barred by the Ninth Circuit’s unchallenged holdings below. Accordingly, the Court remands the case for the Ninth Circuit to consider plaintiffs’ complaint in light of this Court’s decision in Twitter. Pp. 619–622.
2 F. 4th 871, vacated and remanded.
Counsel
Eric Schnapper argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Robert J. Tolchin and Keith L. Altman.
618Deputy Solicitor General Stewart argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging vacatur. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Fletcher, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Granston, Caroline A. Flynn, and Daniel Tenny.
Lisa S. Blatt argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Sarah M. Harris, Aaron Z. Roper, Michael W. McConnell, Steffen N. Johnson, Brian M. Willen, Lauren Gallo White, Cassandra Knight, and Nora Puckett.*
Per Curiam
In 2015, ISIS terrorists unleashed a set of coordinated attacks across Paris, France, killing 130 victims, including 620Nohemi Gonzalez, a 23-year-old U. S. citizen.1Gonzalez’s parents and brothers then sued Google LLC, under 18 621U. S. C. §§ 2333(a) and (d)(2), alleging that Google was both directly and secondarily liable for the terrorist attack that killed Gonzalez.2For their secondary-liability claims, plaintiffs alleged that Google aided and abetted and conspired with ISIS. All of their claims broadly center on the use of YouTube, which Google owns and operates, by ISIS and ISIS supporters.
The District Court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim, though it offered plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. Instead, plaintiffs stood on their complaint and appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in a consolidated opinion that we also addressed in Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U. S. 471 (2023). 2 F. 4th 871 (2021). With respect to this case, the Ninth Circuit held that most of the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 137, 47 U. S. C. § 230(c)(1). The sole exceptions were plaintiffs’ direct- and secondary-liability claims based on allegations that Google approved ISIS videos for advertisements and then shared proceeds with ISIS through YouTube’s revenue-sharing system. The Ninth Circuit held that these potential claims were not barred by § 230, but that plaintiffs’ allegations failed to state a viable claim in any event.
622We granted certiorari to review the Ninth Circuit’s application of § 230. See 598 U. S. ––– (2022). Plaintiffs did not seek review of the Ninth Circuit’s holdings regarding their revenue-sharing claims. In light of those unchallenged holdings and our disposition of Twitter, on which we also granted certiorari and in which we today reverse the Ninth Circuit’s judgment, it has become clear that plaintiffs’ complaint— independent of § 230—states little if any claim for relief. As plaintiffs concede, the allegations underlying their secondary-liability claims are materially identical to those at issue in Twitter. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 58. Since we hold that the complaint in that case fails to state a claim for aiding and abetting under § 2333(d)(2), it appears to follow that the complaint here likewise fails to state such a claim. And, in discussing plaintiffs’ revenue-sharing claims, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs plausibly alleged neither that “Google reached an agreement with ISIS,” as required for conspiracy liability, nor that Google’s acts were “intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, or to influence or affect a government,” as required for a direct-liability claim under § 2333(a). 2 F. 4th, at 901, 907. Perhaps for that reason, at oral argument, plaintiffs only suggested that they should receive leave to amend their complaint if we were to reverse and remand in Twitter. Tr. of Oral Arg. 58, 163.
We need not resolve either the viability of plaintiffs’ claims as a whole or whether plaintiffs should receive further leave to amend. Rather, we think it sufficient to acknowledge that much (if not all) of plaintiffs’ complaint seems to fail under either our decision in Twitter or the Ninth Circuit’s unchallenged holdings below. We therefore decline to address the application of § 230 to a complaint that appears to state little, if any, plausible claim for relief. Instead, we vacate the judgment below and remand the case for the Ninth Circuit to consider plaintiffs’ complaint in light of our decision in Twitter.
It is so ordered.