David Lee Sanders v. Laura Plappert, Warden

The Court applied its decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (“Chevron Deference”) for forty years before finally addressing, in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), whether Chevron Deference was illegal, and holding it was. Similarly, for the past thirty years, the Court has applied AEDPA’s 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1)’s requirement of deference to state court decisions dozens of times without addressing whether §2254(d)(1) violates Article III of the Constitution and/or the Separation of Powers Doctrine. The statute strips the federal courts of their independent authority to declare and apply the law (and to remedy a constitutional violation). As the Court recently did in the context of Chevron Deference, the Court should finally address whether AEDPA Deference (§2254(d)(1)) is unconstitutional. Federal habeas comprises a fair portion of the federal court dockets. Since Loper Bright, litigation over §2254(d)(1)’s unconstitutionality has steadily increased and will continue to do so until the Court decides the matter. Sanders’s Petition presents an ideal vehicle through which to resolve the issue. Whether §2254(d)(1) is unconstitutional was fully developed below, with the Department of Justice intervening. That culminated in a 2–1 detailed decision as to whether §2254(d)(1) is unconstitutional. That matters here. The Sixth Circuit majority believed §2254(d)(1) required disregarding all cases decided after the state court decision and construed clearly established law so narrowly that it may conflict with Andrew v. White, 604 U.S. 86 (2025). That led to claims being rejected that very well may have prevailed without §2254(d)(1). The questions presented are as follows: I. Does 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1) violate either Article III of the United States Constitution or the Separation of Powers Doctrine (or both)? II. Under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1), do the Court’s holdings that post-date a state court’s adjudication of a constitutional claim constitute “clearly established law,” if that holding does not create new law, as the Court’s previous reliance on such cases implies? III. Does Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), provide a minimum level of expert assistance an attorney must ensure to provide effective assistance of counsel or is only an indigent defendant entitled to those protections? IV. Is a jury instruction unconstitutional under Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370 (1990), if the jury applied an erroneous instruction or higher standard proof than the law permits, or only if the instruction prevented consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence?