Clarance Rozell Goode, Jr. v. Oklahoma

Time and again this Court has rejected noncumulative and sufficiency-of-theevidence tests of materiality under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), which the court below applied to deny Petitioner Clarance Goode’s newly discovered due process claims. E.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434–35 (1995); Glossip v. Oklahoma, 145 S. Ct. 612, 626–27 (2025). The State built its case against Mr. Goode on testimony from: co-defendant Ronald “Bunny” Thompson, whose deal allowed him to avoid the death penalty by pointing the finger at Mr. Goode; disgraced Tulsa Police Officer Jeff Henderson, a convicted felon about whom the Tenth Circuit has said, “There is no doubt that Henderson was a bad cop[]”; and disgraced Owasso Police Officer Michael Denton, who, like Henderson and unbeknownst to Mr. Goode’s trial counsel, the police department had disciplined for misconduct that included participating in a “cover up” either by “los[ing], or intentionally misplac[ing] or destroy[ing]” evidence. Also unbeknownst to trial counsel, within 24 hours of the crime, an informant told Denton that Thompson admitted he “was planning to kill” a witness believed to be at the site of the murders “before the evening of the . . . homicides.” Yet Denton omitted this information (which would have impeached Denton and directly contradicted Thompson’s trial testimony) from his reports. The State also never informed trial counsel that Henderson had been disciplined for misusing his authority as a police officer, was investigated for entering false information into a probable cause affidavit, and that Denton had likewise been disciplined for official misconduct. Based on this new suppressed evidence, Mr. Goode timely raised Brady/Napue claims before the court below which refused to consider the evidence related to Denton; failed to cumulate the prejudice stemming from the totality of the suppressed evidence; applied materiality tests trained on the evidence of guilt; and placed the burden on Mr. Goode to prove prejudice under Napue in contravention of Glossip. The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supremacy Clause prohibit a state that opens its collateral review forum to claims under Brady and Napue from refusing to: (i) conduct a cumulative prejudice analysis in assessing the materiality of suppressed evidence; (ii) applying materiality standards that are more demanding than required under Brady and Napue; and (iii) relieving the state of its burden to prove a Napue violation harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. Whether the State of Oklahoma’s Brady and Napue violations entitle Mr. Goode to a new trial and/or capital sentencing proceeding.