Thomas Rutter Woollacott v. United States

For a conviction in a true threats case, the First Amendment requires that the speaker had some subjective understanding that the statement could be interpreted as threatening violence. Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 69 (2023). Title 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) prohibits “threaten[ing] to assault, kidnap, or murder” a qualifying federal official “with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such official… or with intent to retaliate against such official… on account of the performance of official duties[.]” The question presented is: Does a jury finding that a speaker made an objectively threatening statement with the specific intent to impede, intimidate, interfere with, or retaliate against a federal official mean that the jury did not need to also find that the speaker had some subjective understanding that the statement could be understood to threaten violence?