Josef M. Lamell, aka Arpad Lamell, aka J. M. Arpad Lamell v. U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee for CSMC Mortgage-Backed Trust 2007-3, et al.

Question 1 - Whether Respondents Had Authority to Enforce a Private Agreement to Which They Were Not Parties To establish their entitlement as nonparties to enforce the release terms of Petitioner’s private agreement with CIT against him, it was incumbent on Respondents to provide legally-sufficient evidence to satisfy the burden of proof placed on them under Texas law. The opinions below do not identify how or with what evidence and legal predicates that burden was satisfied under governing Texas law. Question 2 - Whether Rights That had Become Void or Time-Barred Under Texas Law May Nevertheless Be Judicially Recognized as Enforceable Even if Respondents were entitled to invoke Petitioner’s private agreement with CIT in state court against him in federal court, the courts below nevertheless authorized foreclosure and collection after effectively holding that Texas law had already rendered the Deed of Trust and power of sale void and collection remedies time-barred. Respondents do not identify any governing Texas law, doctrine, or legally sufficient evidence establishing the legal predicates necessary to justify treating those rights as still enforceable. The foregoing Questions Presented arise from an irreconcilable tension between rulings issued by the district court in the same decision. The findings in the first part of the district court’s decision below (the “Core Findings”) are well supported by governing Texas law and - ii - precedent and establish unequivocally that limitations for Respondents’ foreclosure and collection remedies expired over a decade ago. The mandatory legal consequences thus compelled under Texas law are that their Deed of Trust lien and rights to foreclosure and collection had become respectively void and time-barred. These findings were affirmed on appeal and are not contested. Yet, later in that same decision, the district court construed the wording of Petitioner’s prior agreement settling litigation with CIT in state district court (the “CIT Settlement”) in which Respondents were not parties to either the litigation or the agreement—to effectively reach an enforcement result seemingly incompatible with its own methodical findings in the first part of its decision. Without reference to any governing Texas law or established legal predicate, the district court nevertheless ruled that Respondents were still entitled to invoke the release terms of that agreement to enforce foreclosure and collection against Petitioner as if limitations had not expired and the lien had not become void. - iii -