Edward Smith v. Ohio

Smith pose to this Honorable Court, three questions in which he ask this Court to consider if it decides to accept review of this case. Smith asserts that these questions are of great interest to the public and the future of the criminal justice system as it calls into question the method by which prosecutors clandestinely breech the Supremacy Clause, override lower courts power, as well as violate rules of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, disclosure obligations which in the process compromise defendants due process rights under the 6th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution. This Court recognized that “a State may not be required to provide its citizens with a remedy for its violation of their federal rights, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,144 L. Ed. 2d 636,119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999). The Court is equally unfaithful to that command when it permits state courts to disregard the Nation's treaty obligations.” Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 1037. The First question Smith asks this Court to review ■ After Smith’s conviction was vacated based upon prosecutorial misconduct, he was tried a second time. In the first trial the State of Ohio did not reveal it would call a federal agent to testify, however, during the second retrial the State of Ohio put on the stand a Federal FBI agent. When a ruling that insist that Smith could have discovered evidence in which the State surreptitiously failed to inform defense of its failure to follow proper Touhy regulation procedures, does it depart from every case that insist that it is not a defendant’s duty to scavenge for hints of undisclosed information? See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 697. Unlike State v. Johnston, 39 Ohio St.3d 48, 60, 529 N.E.2d 898 (1988), the First District Court of appeals made no such analysis for Smith’s Brady violation. Should the first District have made a Due process analysis on Smith’s Brady violation claim? Petitioner’s position is that it is not his duty to cross inherent procedural red tape to discovery a prosecutor’s improper methods. The Second question Smith asks this Court to review: Should a claim of a Brady violation in a Motion for leave under Ohio’s Crim.R. 33(B) procedure incur a due process analysis based upon a State prosecutor’s failure to disclose to defense its failure to produce a summarized statement of a Federal FBI agent’s anticipated testimony before testifying in a State case? Petitioner asserts that it should. The Third question Smith asks this Court to review: Did the First District Court error when it failed to apply a due process analysis rather than an abuse of discretion standard when considering whether Smith established the state suppressed the Touhy violation? i.e., did the suppressed evidence deny Smith due process in his right to a fair trial when it suppressed materially favorable evidence in violation of Brady, and Smith’s Sixth and Fourteenth amendment rights? See Wearry v. Cain, (2016) 577 U.S. 385, 396; United States ex rel. Touhy v. Trager?,(1951) 340 U.S. 462, 468; United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2nd Cir. 1944), cited in United States v. Reynolds, (1952) 345 U.S. 1, at 12: footnote 27.