Xzavion Dayshaun Ragsdale v. United States

The supervised release statute provides that a court may revoke supervised release as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) and must revoke supervised release when the violation conduct is of the type specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g). Section 3583(e) lists factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for a court to consider when revoking and sentencing violations of supervised release. That list omits the factors set forth in § 3553(a)(2)(A)—the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense. Section 3583(e) also specifies maximum terms of imprisonment should a court decide to revoke supervised release. Section 3583(g) mandates revocation for specified violations. It cross-references 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)’s statutory maximums for imprisonment but otherwise is silent on the how a revocation sentence should be imposed. In Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025), this Court held that a district court may not rely on the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors as applied to the defendant’s underlying criminal conviction when revoking supervised release under § 3583(e). The question presented is: Does 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) govern sentences imposed after a finding of violations that trigger mandatory revocation under § 3583(g), and does § 3583(e) preclude the court from considering retribution for the supervised release violations?