Bruce Wood v. Delaware

Did the Delaware state courts exceed their legislative authorization under the Multiplicity Doctrine of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment, by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense in Petitioner’s single trial?

When Delaware’s state laws and state court decisions are intertwined with the Blockburger test and other federal holdings for the Double Jeopardy analysis, was the Delaware Supreme Court’s application of the Blockburger test incorrect, ambiguous and/or taken out of context, enabling Petitioner to remain imprisoned illegally in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Fifth Amendment?

Are the Delaware state laws prejudicial and/or unconstitutional for the Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child under Del. Code Title 11§ 778 and Rape in the First Degree under Del. Code Title 11 § 773(b), because the language of these statutes and legislative intent enabled Petitioner to be denied relief by the Delaware Supreme Court, in conflict with the Blockburger test, other federal holdings and the Multiplicity Doctrine of the Double Jeopardy Clauses under the Fifth Amendment?

Did the language in these statutes and legislative intent in the Delaware state , laws under Del. Code Title 11 § 778 and Del. Code Title 11 § 773(b) enable the State Prosecutor to legally apply the simple expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal and spatial units, without specific dates and no creditable evidence for each date (random), without proof beyond a reasonable doubt for each element for each count in violation of the Petitioner’s Rights under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

Does the fact that the Delaware Supreme Court declares there is no Plain Error in Petitioner’s claims in his appeal in their order to affirm, infer that the legislative intent superseded his Double Jeopardy violations and other Federal Constitutional Rights?

Did Petitioner’s answers in his Reply Brief to the Delaware Supreme Court’s “Three Questions” posed to the State in their order denying the State’s motion to affirm, not only show his sentence and/or conviction violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses and there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction, but also infers his Actual Innocence and/or the entire re-indictment was barred from prosecution under the Fifth Amendment?

Is the legislative intent for Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child under Del. Code Title 11 § 778 to deter child sex abuse, similar to the cumulative meaning, as the decision cited in Blockburger v. United States to deter the tearing or mutilation of U.S. Mailbags to be a single offense each time the mailbag was torn, not also a continuous offense and prohibited under the Fifth Amendment?

Does the language and legislative intent of Rape in the First Degree under Del. Code 11 § 773(b) and Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child under Del. Code Title 11 § 778(c), enable the jury to find Petitioner guilty by merely counting each count of Rape, without any specified dates or facts for each count or element of the offense, no credible evidence and without proof beyond ^a reasonable doubt, in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments?

When Petitioner’s 16 counts of Rape in the First Degree under Del. Code Title 11 § 733(5) and 773(6) (both pertain to children), and 2 counts of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child (11 Del. C. 778) stem from the same exact transaction and conduct, and cannot be separated by any distinct time, location or intent, do these statutory crimes need to be identical-either in constituent elements or in actual proof-in order to be the same within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clauses under the Fifth Amendment?

When the Delaware Supreme Court (not Petitioner) points out that Petitioner’s re-indictment has citation errors and questions about his Double Jeopardy violations cited in his Reply Brief, was Petitioner’s Right to Equal Protection of the Law violated under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, when the court denied relief for these Plain Errors, but granted relief to others for these same Plain Errors?

When Sates like Delaware did not provide counsel before This Court’s decision in Martinez (2012) for first collateral proceedings, could Petitioner and others that never had counsel, be permitted to file state or federal post-conviction petitions for their Brady and Napue amendments in Glossip v. Oklahoma (2025), to correct their manifest injustices without procedural bars?