Linh Tran Stephens v. Adam Sylvester Stephens, et al.

Whether the Due Process Clause permits a State to incarcerate a parent whose indigency its own courts have affirmed, for civil contempt based on nonpayment of child support, without any inquiry into her present ability to pay, without proof that her noncompliance was willful, and without consideration of alternatives to incarceration.

Whether a civil-contempt proceeding that imposes a determinate jail sentence, conditioned on a purge amount the contemnor has been found unable to pay, is criminal in nature, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the related criminal-process protections.

Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a second contempt prosecution, and a longer term of incarceration, for the same alleged debt of child-support arrearage while the first contempt judgment remains pending on appeal.

Whether a court, in a contempt proceeding that may result in incarceration, violates the privilege against self-incrimination by instructing the factfinder to draw an adverse inference from the contemnor's silence.

Whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause permits a state court to modify a sister State's final judgment that expressly waived cash child support in exchange for a stipulated transfer of property.

Whether due process permits incarceration for contempt where the lawfulness of the disobeyed order is an element of the offense under state law, yet the trial court barred the accused from contesting it.

Whether due process permits a State child-support agency to act as levying creditor and reviewing adjudicator of its own levy—seizing and irrevocably liquidating a retirement account of nonparty s marriage, before retirement age and by agency letter bearing no judge's name, signature, seal, or file stamp, rather than by any court order or qualified domestic relations order—and to issue a written decision sustaining that levy before the administrative hearing the agency itself had scheduled to review it was ever held.

Whether due process permits a judicial officer to serve simultaneously as accuser and adjudicator in contempt proceedings resulting in incarceration, over the defendant's timely and continuing objections.

Whether the Due Process Clause and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act permit a state court to bar a non-English-speaking pro se defendant from presenting exculpatory evidence or jurisdictional defenses through a pretrial Motion in Limine and trial-time limits that counted interpreter time against her.

Whether the First Amendment's Speech, Free Exercise, and Petition Clauses permit a state court, on pain of terminating all mother-child contact, to prohibit a birth mother—directly or through court-appointed supervisors—from photographing or reporting her female offspring's visible injuries, petitioning for redress concerning the child's safety, or sharing God's Word, including “Armor of God,” with her.