Jawan N. Tarquinii v. Hung Cao, Acting Secretary of the Navy

Title VII allows a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination to establish causation by showing that a protected characteristic was either (1) a but-for cause of an adverse employment action, or (2) a motivating factor in the action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (m). This Court has explained that a case need not “be correctly labeled as either a ‘pretext’ case or a ‘mixed-motives’ case from the beginning in the District Court,” and that “the District Court must decide whether a particular case involves mixed motives.” Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 n.12 (1989) (plurality opinion). The Ninth and Second Circuits follow this Court’s guidance and do not require Title VII plaintiffs to expressly invoke a motivating factor theory to survive summary judgment, so long as they present sufficient evidence supporting that theory. By contrast, the D.C. and Eleventh Circuits require plaintiffs to expressly invoke the motivating factor theory for the district court to consider it at summary judgment. App. 3a-4a. Other circuits have issued conflicting opinions on this issue. The question presented is: Whether, and under what circumstances, a plaintiff must expressly invoke a motivating factor causation standard at summary judgment to preserve that theory of liability for Title VII claims.