John Wimsett v. Kentucky

In Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954), this Court held that “any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during trial about the matter pending before the jury” is presumptively prejudicial. Subsequently, in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-17 (1982), the Court recognized that due process requires a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, with the trial judge “ever watchful” to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen. As stated in Smith, this Court “has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.” Id. at 215. Yet the circuits are split on what a defendant is required to show before a trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing so that a defendant has a meaningful opportunity to show the wrongful conduct and prejudice. In this case the trial court denied Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing even though he presented credible evidence that during the trial jurors consulted an outside source to look up the definition of murder. That is at odds with Remmer and Smith. Thus, the question presented is: Whether the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution require a trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing when presented with credible evidence that a jury was exposed to improper extraneous information, or whether the court may refuse to conduct any inquiry and summarily reject the claim for lack of demonstrated prejudice.