Scott Allen DeBruyn v. Adam Douglas, Warden

This Court has announced two competing interpretations of the level of specificity at which it must articulate a principle in order for it to be “clearly established Federal law” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). In Andrew v. White, this Court held that “[g]eneral legal principles can constitute clearly established law for purposes of AEDPA so long as they are holdings of this Court.” 604 U.S. 86, 94 (2025) (emphasis added). Yet in Brown v. Davenport, this Court said that “holdings that speak only at a high level of generality” cannot clearly establish federal law. 596 U.S. 118, 136 (2022). This lack of clear guidance regarding when general legal principles constitute clearly established federal law has sowed confusion in the lower courts. The question is: For the purposes of adjudicating a state prisoner’s petition for federal habeas relief, at what level of specificity must this Court define a legal principle in order for it to constitute “clearly established Federal law” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)?