P. L. v. R. S.

Whether the Due Process Clause of the Four­ teenth Amendment requires a state court to grant a continuance when a disabled litigant explicitly in­ forms the court at the outset of proceedings that she is cognitively impaired by medically-necessary medi­ cation and cannot meaningfully participate in the hearing—particularly where the court’s own schedul­ ing decision precipitated the medical crisis requiring the medication.

Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabili­ ties Act, 42 U. S. C. §12132, as interpreted by this Court in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U. S. 509 (2004), re­ quires state courts to provide reasonable accommoda­ tions—including brief continuances—when a disabled litigant’s disability-related medical treatment pre­ vents meaningful participation in judicial proceed­ ings.

Whether due process is violated when a state court’s official transcript omits a litigant’s opening statement containing explicit notice of disability-re­ lated impairment and requests for accommodation— thereby preventing meaningful appellate review of constitutional claims and insulating judicial conduct from scrutiny.

Whether due process is violated when a state ap­ pellate court remands a case to the same trial judge who committed statutory and constitutional viola­ tions against the litigant, rather than assigning a dif­ ferent judge, where the probability of bias is too high to be constitutionally tolerable under Rippo v. Baker, 580 U. S. (2017), and Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U. S. 868 (2009).

Whether a trial court violates due process when it limits evidence to post-final order events without prior notice, thereby preventing a litigant from pre­ senting relevant evidence of ongoing stalking patterns and protective order violations.