Alan Walter Colie v. Virginia

Restriction of a criminal legal defense violates due process if it “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Kahler v. Kansas, 589 U.S. 271, 279 (2020) (quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952)). Does the right to selfdefense meet that test, by virtue of Justice Scalia’s extensively-catalogued recognition of self-defense as an “inherent,” “ancient” and “common law” right in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and subsequent cases? If so, did the Virginia courts violate due process by effectively stopping Mr. Colie’s jury from considering self-defense, when deliberating on the only remaining allegation against him: unlawful discharge of a firearm? (After acquitting Mr. Colie of all other criminal charges on the basis of bona fide selfdefense?)

United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984), holds that a conviction shall not be disturbed merely because it is inconsistent with an acquittal on a related count, because the inconsistency may result from mistake, compromise, or lenity from the jury. However, Footnote 8 of that opinion reserved whether the same tolerance applies where two verdicts are not merely inconsistent but logically exclusive. Id. at 69 n.8. Here, the jury acquitted Mr. Colie of every criminal allegation arising from his single act of firing his firearm, but for one: unlawful discharge of the firearm. But the jury’s numerous acquittals here are clearly explained by self-defense rather than mistake, compromise, or lenity. Does due process require vacatur of the sole conviction, consistent with Powell’s Footnote 8 exception, where the jury’s verdicts as a whole rationally convey that they found the act legally justified by self-defense, foreclosing lawful conviction?