Nichol Royston v. City of Scottsdale, Arizona

In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, this Court held that to allege an adverse employment action—such as an adverse transfer—the Petitioner “does not have to show . . . that the harm incurred was significantfl [o]r serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective sug­ gesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar.” 601 U. S. 346, 355 (2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In­ stead, the text of Title VII requires only that a trans­ feree show “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.” Ibid.

1. Does the Ninth Circuit decision, which relied on pre-Muldrow opinions, conflict with Muldrow and post Muldrow decisions in other Circuits by finding no actionable employment harm in an involuntary trans­ fer, solely because the employee retained her title, rank, and pay, despite evidence of materially adverse changes to her employment terms and conditions?

2. Whether the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 allow em­ ployers to use past protected leave or speculative fu­ ture leave related to a disability, including cancer, as a legitimate reason for adverse actions without follow­ ing the ADA’s interactive process or showing undue hardship.