California Crane School, Inc. v. Google LLC, et al.

Whether the Ninth Circuit has ignored this Court’s well-established standards regarding per se antitrust violations, including division of markets (United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990)), profit pooling (Citizen Publ’g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969), foreclosure of competitors from a substantial market (Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)), and price fixing (United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)), where the Second Amended Complaint plausibly alleged horizontal agreements between Google and Apple to divide markets, share profits, and foreclose competition, as corroborated by the findings in United States v. Google LLC, 20- cv-3010-APM (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2024).

Whether a district court may stay all discovery in an antitrust case based solely on a “preliminary peek” at a pending motion to dismiss, without any showing of good cause as required by Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in derogation of the due process and equal protection rights of plaintiffs, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s own precedent in Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963).

Whether this Court should resolve the conflict between the Ninth Circuit’s decision below and the District of Columbia’s decision in United States v. Google LLC, 747 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2024), which found that Google’s