John Paul Beaudoin, Sr. v. Charles D. Baker, Jr., et al.

In the past 40 years, case dismissals increased in frequency and now occur earlier in the litigation process. In 1986, the standard to survive summary judgment in the discovery phase was heightened in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby (1986) and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), which became the two most cited cases in U.S. history. In Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife (1992), this Court resolved disparities among the Circuit Courts by defining a 3-prong test for “standing,” used to dismiss cases in the pleading stage. In 2007 and 2009, the pleading “plausibility” standard was height­ ened via Bell Atlantic v. Twombly (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009), newly the most cited two cases in U.S. history by a large margin in only 16 years and used almost exclusively to dismiss cases after the initial complaint. In 2020, an overwhelming workload event besieged U.S. Courts when 414,469 civil cases were filed, 180,538 (62%) more than expected. The over­ whelming workload manifested habitual dismissals of meritorious cases, thus violating plaintiffs’ rights to due process, petition for redress, and access to courts for dispute resolution. Dismissals of meritorious cases en masse leave disputes unresolved, which, in turn, causes a breakdown of civil society. The Question Presented is: Whether the lower court erred in dismissing this case on standing and pleading standards? Whether meritorious cases filed in U.S. Courts are habitually dismissed under heightened Fed. R. Civ. P. doctrines in violation of Constitutional rights to access the courts for dispute resolution? Whether decisions under Fed. R. Civ. P. are effectively equitable and should be scrutinized as such?