Victor Saldano v. Texas

In 2017 this Court held that the Briseno factors adopted by Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA) for evaluating an Atkins claim were based on superseded medical standards that created an unacceptable risk that a person with intellectual disabilities would be executed in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. 1 (2017) (Moore I). On remand, the TCCA determined that Moore was not a person with intellectual disability, a determination that this Court held was erroneous in Moore v. Texas, 139 S.Ct. 666 (2019) (Moore II). Mr. Saldaño has never before raised an Atkins claim and last sought relief in state courts in 2008. After the evaluation of experts for Mr. Saldaño and the State – represented here by the Collin County District Attorney’s Office (CCDAO) – all experts agreed that Mr. Saldaño met the criteria for IDD. Subsequently, Mr. Saldaño argued to the TCCA that his claim met the procedural requirements of Texas Criminal Code Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(1) based on the new legal basis of Moore I and Moore II. The state court did not address any of his arguments on the merits in its ruling, and upended nearly a decade of precedent by holding for the first time that Moore I and Moore II were not a new legal basis for relief in Texas state court. Additionally, the TCCA also held that despite the unanimous agreement of experts evaluating Mr. Saldaño for Intellectual Developmental Disorder (IDD), Mr. Saldaño did not meet Article 11.071, Section 5(a)(3)’s requirements of demonstrating that by clear and convincing evidence, no reasonable jury would have failed to find him IDD. No court has ever meaningfully considered the merits of Mr. Saldaño’s Atkins claim, nor has a court meaningfully considered the State’s concession of the procedural gateway and Mr. Saldaño’s IDD diagnosis. The questions presented are:

1. Does the TCCA’s creation of a novel and unforeseeable procedural bar in its interpretation of Article 11.071 Section 5 preclude review of Mr. Saldaño’s Atkins claim under federal law?

2. May a state-created procedural rule bar review of an Atkins claim consistent with due process where the State has conceded, as here, that the individual meets the criteria for intellectually disability and the procedural gateway necessary to allow for a merits review?