Andrew Grimm v. City of Portland, Oregon

Whether governmental obligations to attempt further notice under the Mullane standard can only be triggered if the government has “actual knowledge” that notice was not successful, as the Ninth Circuit held below, or is also triggered by “good reasons to suspect” that notice was not successful, as stated in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006), and echoed by other Circuits and apex State courts.

Whether, prior to seizing private vehicles in nonexigent circumstances, a city has any duty under the Mullane standard, as elaborated upon in Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 794 (1983), to make any attempt to check for contact information in obvious places that the city knows will have contact information, such as DMV vehicle-registration records or the city’s own smartphone parking app.

Whether a government can rely solely on posting to attempt notice under the Mullane standard, despite Mennonite and Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982), where piled-up infraction notices indicated (accurately) that postings hadn’t been seen and hadn’t been received.

Whether to grant, vacate, and remand in light of Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).

Whether to grant, vacate, and remand in light of City of L.A. v. David, 538 U.S. 715 (2003).