Patrick D. Reed v. George A. Fredrick, Warden

The Confrontation Clause prohibits trial testimony that relays an absent declarant’s out-of-court “inculpating statements.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 65 (2004). When the prosecution asserts that an inculpating statement is being used for a purpose other than its truth and the trial court issues a limiting instruction, the statement remains barred by the Confrontation Clause unless its admission is necessary to the trial’s “truth-seeking function” and there are “no alternatives” to using the inculpating statement. Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415-17 (1985). Petitioner Patrick Reed was convicted of drug-possession charges in state court. At trial, a police officer testified that a confidential informant said that “Mr. Reed concealed narcotics” on the roof of a six-person residence. Mr. Reed never had the chance to confront the informant who accused him of committing a crime. But the prosecution asserted that the inculpatory statement was being used to explain the course of the officer’s investigation to the jury, and the trial court issued a limiting instruction to that effect—even though a non-incriminating statement would have equally explained the course of the officer’s investigation. A divided Sixth Circuit panel denied Mr. Reed’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The question presented is: Whether, as three circuits hold in conflict with the Sixth Circuit, clearly established law prohibits an officer’s testimony about an absent declarant’s expressly incriminating statements for the asserted reason of providing background context about an investigation.