Philip G. Potter v. Incorporated Village of Ocean Beach, New York, et al.

This Court has repeatedly instructed courts to determine when a claim challenging state action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accrues by first “identifying ‘the specific constitutional right’ alleged to have been infringed.” McDonough v. Smith, 588 U.S. 109, 115 (2019); see, e.g., Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 236 (2023); Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 370 (2017). The Second Circuit, however, takes a different approach in cases involving disputes over land use. Rather than focus on the “ ‘the specific constitutional right’ ” at issue, the Second Circuit subjects procedural due process claims asserted in the land-use context to the accrual rule for takings claims announced in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), and refined in Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019), and Pakdel v. City & County of San Francisco, 594 U.S. 474 (2021). That one-size-fits-all approach tracks the law of the Third Circuit. But it conflicts with the approach taken by the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, which apply the takings rule only to claims that seek relief for takings. The question presented is: Whether the accrual rule for takings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 applies to procedural due process claims asserted in land-use disputes. (i)