Douglas Wain, et ux. v. Kimberly Nell Bunnell, Chief Regional Judge, 22nd Judicial Circuit Division 9, Fayette County, Kentucky, et al.

The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause guarantees litigants a fair tribunal. This Court has held that due process requires mandatory judicial disqualification when a judge has a significant personal interest in a matter before her. See Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). At the same time, absolute judicial immunity bars civil suits against judges for acts performed in their judicial capacity. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). This case presents the unresolved question of how these two doctrines interact when the judicial act itself is the constitutional violation. The questions presented are: I. Whether absolute judicial immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 bars a civil rights claim against a state court judge who issued a dispositive ruling against plaintiffs three days after being served at her judicial chambers with those same plaintiffs' federal civil rights complaint naming her as a defendant, where the ruling dismissed counterclaims that had been pending for nearly six years at a hearing noticed only for limited procedural matters. II. Whether Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016), and Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), which together establish that the Due Process Clause requires mandatory disqualification where a judge has a significant personal stake in a matter adverse to a litigant, create a constitutional limitation on the scope of