Daisey Trust, By and Through Its Trustee Eddie Haddad, et al. v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, et al.

In Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America, Limited, 601 U.S. 416 (2024) (“CFPB”), this Court upheld CFPB’s funding mechanism under the Appropriations Clause because—even though it is funded outside the annual appropriations process—Congress enacted a statute identifying a “source and purpose” for the funds and there was a statutory cap on how much CFPB can draw from the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Housing Finance Agency is also funded outside the annual appropriations process. But, unlike CFPB, Congress has not set a ceiling on how much FHFA may raise and spend. Does FHFA’s funding mechanism, 12 U.S.C. § 4516, violate the Appropriations Clause for lack of a cap, sum certain, or other ascertainable limit?

In CFPB, members of this Court recognized “Congress obviously cannot evade the Appropriations Clause simply by placing a different label on an authorization” through a statute providing that “[f]unds . . . shall not be construed to be Government funds or appropriated monies.” Similarly, 12 U.S.C. § 4516(f)(2) states that “[t]he amounts received by the Director from any assessment . . . shall not be construed to be Government or public funds or appropriated money.” Does 12 U.S.C. § 4516(f)(2) violate the Appropriations Clause?

The nondelegation doctrine requires Congress to impose intelligible principles to constrain the Executive Branch. 12 U.S.C. § 4516 allows FHFA’s Director to collect “the amount sufficient to provide for reasonable costs . . . and expenses of the Agency.” Does 12 U.S.C. § 4516 violate the nondelegation doctrine?