Daryao Khatri v. Board of Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia

Federal employees’ rights are determined under statutes which require that “all personnel actions effecting employees or applicants for employment ... in executive agencies as defined in Title 5 ... shall be made free from any discrimination ...” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 16(a) (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) (emphasis added); 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (age). This Court, in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), interpreted the private-sector statutory language “because” in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), and “because of’ in 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), respectively, as requiring a private-sector plaintiff to prove but-for causation. The District of Columbia and by extension the employees of the University of the District of Columbia are covered by the same rules as Federal employees when dealing with age discrimination. Employees of the District government shall have certain rights to file complaints with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) pursuant to § 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, and to pursue remedies provided for in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 626 and 633. The Question Presented Is: Whether the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (DCCA) and the lower courts erred on two counts: (1) by not considering the Supreme Court ruling of April 6, 2020 (No. 18-882) in the case of Babb and Wilkie where the court held: “The plain meaning of § 633a(a) demands that personnel actions be untainted by any consideration of age”; and (2) by believing the defendant’s