William Felkner v. John Nazarian, et al.

The Court's "qualified immunity jurisprudence stands on shaky ground." Hoggard v. Rhodes, 141 S. Ct. 2421 (2021) (Thomas, J., statement respecting the denial of certiorari). Its "clearly established law" standard lacks any textual or historical link to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and bears no resemblance to the origins of the qualified immunity doctrine, see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). The modern standard has also proven unworkable in practice, with the Court routinely using certiorari and per curiam opinions to correct lower court confusion and errors. The policy rationales relied upon to justify qualified immunity have likewise proven misplaced. The Court has never explained why the law requires a one-size-fits-all standard that provides the same immunity to deskbound governmental officials— who have ample time to ponder decisions—as it grants to police officers in the field, who must make split-second decisions in life-or-death situations. These shortcomings have led several justices to question or even recommend reconsidering the doctrine. See Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862, 1862 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871- 72 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1155 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S.