Brad Johnson v. PennyMac Loan Services, LLC

Within the context of its de novo review, in interpreting the regulatory language and meaning of 12 C.F.R. § 1024.37(b) (Basis for charging borrower for force-placed insurance), pursuant to the Supreme Court’s Mandate under its Chevron Doctrine, did the North Carolina Court of Appeals commit reversible error by (a) erroneously giving complete deference, under Chevron, to 12 C.F.R. § 1024.37(b), while, at the same time, (b) completely ignoring (1) 12 C.F.R. § 1024.37(a)(1) (Definition of force-placed insurance) and (2) the legislative history, intent and meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k) (Servicer prohibitions), both of which directly address the specific issue at bar?

Within the context of its de novo review, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s Mandate under its Chevron Doctrine, in applying 12 C.F.R. § 1024.37(b) (Basis for charging borrower for force-placed insurance) to the facts of the instant case, did the North Carolina Court of Appeals commit reversible error by (a) giving complete deference, under Chevron, to 12 C.F.R. § 1024.37(b), while, at the same time, (b) completely ignoring (1) 12 C.F.R. § 1024.37(a)(1) (Definition of force-placed insurance) and (2) the legislative history, intent and meaning of 12 U.S.C. § 2605(k) (Servicer prohibitions), thereby effectuating a Taking of Johnson’s property pursuant to U.S. Const, amend, V & XIV? \ \