Jeffrey Wills Lusk, Individually and as Executor of the Estate of Dorothy Jean Ross Lusk, Deceased v. Alsata Salimatu Lamin, et al.

Should a conspiracy motivated by invidiously discrim­ inatory intent other than racial bias be actionable un­ der 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the possibility of which was left open in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), given 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) makes no reference to race? Should the invidious discriminatory intent of the con­ spirators be considered more vigorously, and the classbased aspect of the conspirators’ animus be deemphasized, when analyzing 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) claims? Should a specific intent requirement replace the classbased animus requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)? Should all federal courts be compelled to extend 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) protections to disabled individuals, thereby, resolving the inconsistency, confusion, and in­ congruity lingering in the class-based aspect of the conspirators’ animus giving full effect to the Congres­ sional purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) in line with 42 U.S.C. § 12101- ADA Amendments Act of2008 (ADAAA)? Does the U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 5 authorize Con­ gress to reach purely private conduct? Since Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) should the constitutional basis of Congressional power to en­ act 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and to use it to reach private conspiracies be based on the U.S. Const, amend. XIV, §5? Hi< \ > ' 7 !