Jheshua Daniel Jackson v. Colorado

Long before Justice Hugo Black emphasized that a “person’s . . . right to his day in court” is “basic in our system of jurisprudence,” In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948), the First Congress convened under our Constitution added the Sixth Amendment to our National Charter, which “stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not ‘still be done.’” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Indeed, [f]rom the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law]. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). At a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that a “defendant in a criminal case” has the constitutional right to, among other things, “notice and opportunity to answer the charge” and a “trial according to the established course of judicial proceedings.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 49 (1932). The Petitioner, Mr. Jheshua Daniel Jackson, confronted criminal allegations related to his alleged use of another person’s credit card. During his trial, a Colorado judge refused his request to revoke his decision to represent himself while simultaneously holding him in criminal contempt and banishing him from his own criminal trial. Consequently, Mr. Jackson was tried in absentia and convicted of one felony and three misdemeanor charges.