Ker'Sean Olajuwa Ramey v. Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

In rejecting Ramey’s claim for relief under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (“Batson Claim”) and ignoring Ramey’s argument that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) entitled him to relief without addressing any of the considerations this Court’s decisions identify as relevant to determining whether racial bias motivated the prosecution’s exercise of a peremptory strike, did the Fifth Circuit decide that important federal question “in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court”? Sup. Ct. R. 10(c).

Did the Fifth Circuit err in denying Ramey a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase (“Mitigation Claim”), given that reasonable jurists could debate whether the equitable considerations underlying Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (as extended by Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013)) (“Martinez/ Trevino”) demand a similar narrow exception to Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) that would apply here?

Alternatively, did the Fifth Circuit err in denying Ramey a COA on the Mitigation Claim because reasonable jurists could debate whether the new evidence he developed in federal court fundamentally altered the claim that had been adjudicated on the merits in state court, thereby rendering it a new, unexhausted claim eligible for consideration in federal court via Martinez/Trevino? (i)