Charles G. Kinney v. United States, et al.

Here, judges intentionally abused a “ministerial” act to conceal or cover-up that other judges had intentionally abused an “administrative” act to excessively punish petitioner. The improper acts don’t provide “judicial” immunity for any judge. The “ministerial” act was sending the appeal to the wrong court. The “administrative” act was creating a global vexatious litigant order. This is similar to SCOTUS #21-668 (Judge Chen) but here a RICO element exists because Judges Wallace, Silverman, and Bybee acted together to punish petitioner based on “void” [on their face] 2008 and 2011 state vexatious litigant orders against “attorney” Kinney (who was not a party). The “law enforcement proviso” exception to the FTCA’s exclusion of intentional torts by federal law enforcement officers (acting within the scope of their employment) applies to “ministerial” or “administrative” acts made by a Judge as to an abuse of process or malicious prosecution of a judicial-corruption whistle-blower like Kinney who is asserting his US Constitutional rights. The Ninth Circuit made a not “narrowly tailored” vexatious litigant pre-filing order on 1/19/18. Kinney’s FTCA claim was denied. A complaint was filed. His complaint was dismissed sua sponte by Judge Tigar. His appeal was then sent to the wrons appellate court, and his appeal was dismissed sua sponte by the Ninth Circuit.