K. John Corrigan, et al. v. Deb Haaland, Secretary of the Interior, et al.

The Chevron doctrine requires a federal court under certain circumstances to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” before the court. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). In this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit conceded that the statutes bearing on this case – the Taylor Grazing Act and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act – are silent on the issue of statutory interpretation that was presented to it, namely, whether the Bureau of Land Management (“Bureau”) can treat a longstanding Grazing preference as cancelled without following the regulations specifically governing cancellation of a Grazing preference. The Ninth Circuit resolved this issue of statutory interpretation, despite the conceded statutory silence, on the ground that the statutes are unambiguous. The question presented is: Whether the Ninth Circuit correctly held that statutory silence on the issue before the court can be unambiguous for purposes of the Chevron doctrine and accordingly justify the court’s disregarding the statutory interpretation embodied in the agency’s regulations.