Douglass Properties II, LLC v. City of Olympia, Washington

In Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 619, 133 S.Ct. 2586, 186 L.Ed.2d 697 (2013), this Court clarified that the requirements of the Nollan/Dolan1 doctrine apply to a government agency’s demand for property from a land-use permit applicant “even when the government denies the permit and even when its demand is for money.” This Court recognized that demands for money create the same risk that “the government may use its substantial power and discretion in land-use permitting to pursue governmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to the effects of the proposed new use of the specific property at issue.” 570 U.S. at 614. The dissent in Koontz criticized the majority, inter alia, for failing to clarify whether a distinction between “adjudicative” and “legislative” impact fees still exists. 570 U.S. at 628 (Kagen, J., dissenting). The question presented in this case is: Whether, after Koontz, the Nollan/Dolan doctrine applies generally to impact fees, i.e., whether after Koontz there is any distinction between “adjudicative” and “legislative” fees when a government agency demands money or property as a condition of issuing a 1 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994).