Brad Heidelberg, dba Rio Seco Resources, et al. v. D.O.H. Oil Company

Since Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), this Court has repeatedly held that—for known or reasonably ascertainable persons—due process requires more than notice by publication or posting. This Court has repeatedly applied those bedrock due-process requirements to displace the effect of state statutes that restrict the time for known and reasonably ascertainable persons to challenge a judgment where they were not given constitutionally sufficient notice. E.g., Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 491 (1988). Lack of sufficient due process makes the underlying judgment void. Petitioners were known or reasonably ascertainable from County property records. But their nonparticipating royalty interests were sold at foreclosure for allegedly unpaid taxes, where the County provided notice by mere posting, incorrectly referencing Petitioners as purported “unknown owners” of those mineral interests. The Appellate Court’s opinion assumes that “service of process by posting was ineffective ‘to apprise [Petitioners] of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections,’” such that Petitioners were “deprived of their property without due process,” quoting Mullane. (App., infra, 7a.) Yet the Appellate Court went on to affirm the trial court’s summary-judgment grant against Petitioners based on a two-year state-limitations statute. May a state-limitations statute preclude challenge to a judgment obtained by notice that is constitutionally insufficient to meet the requirements of due process as established in Mullane and its progeny?