Derwin Patten, et al. v. District of Columbia

As legislated by Congress, the Randolph Sheppard Act of 1936 requires an exhaustion of administrative remedies by blind people aggrieved by a Randolph Sheppard Vending Facilities Program (“Randolph-Sheppard program”). As provided for in the act, the U.S. Department of Education authorizes state governments and the District of Columbia to establish Randolph-Sheppard programs, which license blind citizens to be self-employed retailers or “blind vendors” inside government buildings. However, the Randolph Sheppard Act does not bar state governments and the District of Columbia from discriminating against the blind. In this case, the questions presented, which should be settled by this Court, and which the D.C. Circuit decided in a way that conflicts with this Court’s reasoning in Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 137 S.Ct. 743 (2017), and which conflicts with the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Randolph v. Rogers, 253 F.3d 342 (2001), may be stated as follows: 1. Does a federal statute that requires an exhaustion of administrative remedies bar a public entity discrimination claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and a state antidiscrimination statute when the plaintiff files the discrimination claim in court without exhausting administrative remedies, but does so on the basis of the state’s statutory waiver of its federal right to exhaust such remedies? 2. With its requirement for an exhaustion of administrative remedies, does the Randolph Sheppard Act preclude relief under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and state antidiscrimination statutes for public entity discrimination against blind vendors and other disabled persons in the Randolph-Sheppard program?