Barry Smith, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale, et al. v. Aaron Edmunds Tyson

Under Pennsylvania law it is well-settled that to be found guilty of First Degree Murder as an accomplice, a defendant must have the specific intent to kill and to aid, attempt to aid, or agree to the aid the principal in the commission of the crime charged. The trial court’s jury instructions tracked Pennsylvania accomplice liability law and informed the jury of the required elements of the offense, and in no way relieved the burden to prove each element of the crime charge beyond a reasonable doubt. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Pennsylvania appellate courts and U.S. District Court, laboring to find a due process violation by characterizing the jury instructions as ambiguous and leaping to conclude that counsel committed error, which were reasonably likely to cause the jury to misapply the law and relax the burden of proof.

1. Whether the review required under AEDPA § 2254 and Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) is violated by reliance upon a “some ambiguity” standard utilized by the Court of Appeals to find a due process violation without affording the required benefit of the doubt to both defense counsel and the trial court?

2. Does the Court of Appeals decision granting habeas relief on the basis of alleged erroneous jury instructions in a state accomplice murder trial err by failing to apply this court’s own precedent in Waddington v. Sarasaud, 129 S.Ct. 823 (2009)?

3. By ignoring whole sections of the trial court’s charge to the jury with respect to accomplice liability and failing to view it in the context of the trial record did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that there exists a substantial and not just a conceivable likelihood of a different result?