Balubhai Patel, et al. v. Manuel Chavez

Congress has specifically protected plaintiffs who bring federal civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from having to pay fees unless their suit is “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Hughes v Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15 (1980) (per curiam). Congress enacted this protection to ensure that plaintiffs will not be deterred from bringing good faith actions to vindicate the fundamental rights here involved by the prospect of having to pay their opponent’s counsel fees should they lose. As this Court has explained, “[a]ny less stringent of a standard would substantially add to the risks inhering in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of the civil rights laws.” Hughes, 449 U.S. at 15 (quoting Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978)). This Court has also held that the fee shifting provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) is an integral part of the remedy necessary to obtain compliance with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and applies equally to § 1983 cases filed in state or federal court. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980). The California Court of Appeal held that the State’s antiSLAPP statute, California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16(c)(1), which requires a court to order a plaintiff who loses a motion brought under the statute to pay the prevailing defendants’ attorney’s fees, did not unduly burden a substantive federal right when applied to a plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, and therefore the statute was not preempted under the Supremacy Clause. The question presented is: Whether California’s anti-SLAPP statute’s