Kepa Maumau v. United States

Model jury instructions define Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, to include takings caused by fear of future economic harm to “intangible property.” While such conduct could be a “crime of violence” under the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), this Court struck down the residual clause in United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2139 (2019). Is Hobbs Act robbery categorically a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)’s “force clause”?

Petitioner Kepa Maumau was convicted of § 924(c) based on Hobbs Act robbery. Following the Tenth Circuit pattern jury instructions, the court instructed the jury that Hobbs Act robbery was a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and that it could be committed by causing fear of future economic harm to “intangible property.” Did the court violate Mr. Maumau’s due process rights when it told the jury he was guilty of § 924(c) if he committed Hobbs Act robbery by threatening future harm to intangible property?

Mr. Maumau was also convicted of § 924(c) based on crimes of violence that could be committed recklessly. Does a crime that can be committed recklessly qualify categorically as a “crime of violence” under the force clause of § 924(c)?