Devon E. Sanders v. United States

Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts under federal statutes relating to possession of child pornography. One count charged knowing receipt of three particular illicit ―visual depictions‖ in December 2015. The other charged possession of computer hard drives in May 2016 that he knew to contain numerous prohibited images, including those received six months earlier. At sentencing, petitioner argued unsuccessfully under the Double Jeopardy Clause that the two counts could support only one punishment. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that the possession count encompassed more images than the three identified in the receipt count, even though the number of images is legally immaterial. The question is: For purposes of determining whether two offenses are the ―same,‖ does the Double Jeopardy Clause take into account only those facts that are essential for establishing the elements of the two offenses?

As part of his sentence for receiving and possessing child pornography in 2015–2016, petitioner was ordered to pay an average of more than $4100 in restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 to each of 22 individuals depicted in those images. The court of appeals affirmed, over petitioner‘s argument that the district court‘s determination of these amounts disregarded the first, critical step of the methodology articulated by this Court in Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 449 (2014), that is, ―disaggregation‖ of harm caused by the original acts of child abuse depicted in the images, with which petitioner had no involvement. The question, on which the Circuits are divided, is: In assessing restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 for a pre-12/7/2018 offense of possessing child pornography, must the court first ensure that the defendant is not being required to pay for losses his offense did not cause? -i-