Machiavelli Farrakhan Siberius v. American Public University System, Inc., et al.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter, such as Schumann v. Collier Anesthesia, P.A., Case No: 2:12-cv347-FtM-29CM (M.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2016) and disagreed with a historical case of the Fourth Circuit, Reich v. Shiloh True Light Church of Christ, 895 F.Supp. 799, 819 (W.D.N.C. 1995). “At what point does a student become an ‘employee’ for an employer, due to the various types of abuses and exploitation of a free labor system, in an education program?”

The District Judge had considered a federal question in a way that conflicts with other federal district decisions, like Winfield v. Babylon Beauty Sch. of Smithtown Inc., 89 F. Supp. 3d 556 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) and Marshall v. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Tenn. 1979), and further conflicts with the “FLSA” 29 U.S. Code § 213(a)(1), 29 CFR § 541.303(c), 29 CFR § 541.602(1); and this conflict transitions to state laws, such as California Education Code, Section 44462, and W.Va. Code §18A3-2, and this further moves into a parallel to modern violations of the Thirteenth Amendment by not defining “an employer employee relationship between the plaintiff and either Pressley Ridge or the WVDE.” Should student-teachers and teacher candidates be denied payment under all circumstances, denied employee status at a school, due to student status at a separate school or university?

Was the Fourteenth Amendment “Due Process Clause,” “Equal Protection Clause,” and Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution breached by the defendants, in the fashion that Mr. Siberius was terminated from a student-teaching position at Pressley Ridge at White Oak, for reporting child abuse, in accordance with state laws, contracts, freedom of speech, and scope of duty as a studentteacher?

In accordance with Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 25(d) and Fed.Rule App.Proc. 43 and Robinson v. Integrative Detention Health Services, No. 3:12-CV-20, (M.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2014), Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961): can a corporation headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania be responsible for acting “under color of law” in the State of West Virginia?

A state agency waived its Eleventh Amendment “immunity” by voluntarily appearing in federal court. In Hafer v. Melo et al., 502 U.S. 21, 112 S. Ct. 358 (1991) the Court held that state officials “acting in their official capacities” are outside the class of “persons” subject to liability under § 1983 was reversed, and in Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56 (4th Cir. 1995) that specifies the importance of the substance of a complaint rather than the named individuals, to sue individuals in official capacity and individual capacity, leaving the Courts to decide. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-166 (1985). To what extent has the Courts erred in applying Will v. Michigan Dept, of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), given other ruhngs, and the specific context of the plaintiffs circumstance for civil action?

Can a school board be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983?