Tarek Obaid v. United States

In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), this Court held that “in order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising ‘jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.’ The standard for determining whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum-contacts standard elucidated in International Shoe.” Id. at 207 (citation omitted); see Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945). For true in rem cases, such as civil forfeiture, the Shaffer Court stated that “it would be unusual for the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction” because the presence of the property within the forum indicates that the owner “expected to benefit from the States’ protection of his interest” and the “State’s strong interests in assuring the marketability of property within its borders” further confirms the fairness of exercising jurisdiction in such cases. Id. at 207-08. In this case, however, the property or “res” is not present in the forum; it is located overseas. The Ninth Circuit in this case ruled that Shaffer and the “minimum contacts” test is irrelevant to in rem proceedings; all that matters is that the property be present within the forum, reviving the presence-based regime of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Here, the government never disputed that, pursuant to California’s property situs law, the res (stock) is absent from the forum because it is sited overseas. Despite this, the Ninth Circuit concluded that all property subject to forfeiture is per se “present” in the forum by operation of 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b)(1)—thus preempting States’ property situs laws—because it creates a “legal fiction” that property is legally sited wherever any of the acts or omissions giving rise to the forfeiture occurred. United States v. Obaid, 971 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, under the majority opinion, all property, including real estate—anywhere in the world—has been deemed by Congress to be legally sited in the United States, in any district in which any act or omission giving rise to the forfeiture occurred. Under this logic, Section 1355(b) is a federal property situs law that defines a property’s situs for purposes of federal forfeiture (both civil and criminal), preempting States’ property situs laws. The questions presented are: Does the Due Process Clause, as construed by Shaffer v. Heitner, require application of the “minimum contacts” test to true in rem proceedings?; and Does 28 U.S.C. § 1355(b) preempt State property situs laws and create a “legal fiction” that property subject to forfeiture—located anywhere in the world—is legally sited in “the district in which any of the acts or omissions giving rise to the forfeiture occurred”? If the answer to the above question is “yes,” does the “legal fiction” of property situs established by 28 U.S.C. 1355(b) per se satisfy due process and thereby dispense with a court’s obligation to determine whether a property owner himself has actual, purposeful, minimum contacts with the forum?