Loring Edwin Justice v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee

Justice, relying on Spevack v. Klein and McKune v. Lile, invoked his Fifth Amendment right in a Tennessee disbarment proceeding. Did Tennessee violate the self-incrimination clause when it forced Justice to testify or suffer adverse inferences costing him his Tennessee law license?

Tennessee acknowledges this Court requires attorney disciplinary proceedings to be quasicriminal but imposes civil law standards of proof for disbarring an attorney (e.g., preponderance) and administrative law standards for review on appeal (e.g., affirming factual findings based on a “scintilla or glimmer” of evidence). Tennessee’s attorney disciplinary system also combines all investigative and prosecutorial functions within the Tennessee Supreme Court – going so far as to allow the panel judging the accused attorney, to prosecute the accused. Does the structure of Tennessee’s disciplinary system violate the due process clause and In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) and In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968)?