Khalil Williams v. Housing Opportunities for Persons with Exceptionalities

In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green and its progeny, this Court “set forth the basic allocations of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging discriminatory treatment.”1 In Burdine, the Supreme Court subsequently held that “[t]he burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous,” and that to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff need only show that she experienced an adverse employment action “under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”2 However, in cases where comparator evidence is not available, the Eleventh Circuit does not utilize the burden-shifting framework but instead applies a “convincing mosaic” approach, under which “[a] triable issue of fact exists if the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents ‘a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.’”3 Applying this approach, the court below concluded that the decisionmaker’s racial slur uttered when she discharged the African-American plaintiff was not sufficient evidence of race discrimination. The question presented is: What test should courts use in evaluating motions for summary judgment in discrimination cases when the

1. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093 (1981) (discussing , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973)).

2. Id. at 253.

3. Khalil Williams v. Housing Opportunities for Persons with Exceptionalities, No. 18-13600, at 7 (11th Cir., Jul. 15, 2019) (“App. Op.”).