John F. Sharpe v. United States

This case concerns the Defense Finance and Ac­ counting Service (DFAS) and its inexplicable refusal under 10 U.S.C. § 1552(c) to calculate, with respect to certain military pay and allowances, which it ad­ ministers, the amounts “found to be due the [Peti­ tioner] on account of his service in the . . . Navy,” id., following the correction of his naval record by the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), acting through the Board for Correction of Naval Records (BCNR). Instead of exercising its discretion as obliged un­ der § 1552(c) - clearly interpreted by regulations and by 65 years’ worth of settled administrative and judi­ cial case law, consistent with the legislative history as to the statute’s meaning - and under 31 U.S.C. § 3702, implemented at 32 C.F.R. § 281, making DFAS responsible for setting military pay claims, the latter balked, instead demanding — a year after SECNAV’s favorable action - that Navy personnel officials tell DFAS what the financial consequences of Petitioner’s § 1552 record correction should be. The Navy im­ properly acquiesced, for purposes of litigation (then stayed in the Court of Federal Claims), and had a uniformed attorney draft a letter for a civilian col­ league in the Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS), direct­ ing DFAS to “re-correct” Petitioner’s record to arrive at the entitlements outcome Navy litigators thought appropriate, not only contrary to the original Secre­ tarial correction but in violation of every conceivable correction-board case, statute, and regulation. Both the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit upheld the Navy lawyers’ actions, while strangely ignoring the volume of statutory, regulato­ ry, and case law cited in Petitioner’s briefs. (I)