Harshad Shah v. United States

One hundred and thirty years ago, in Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880), this Court condemned the exploitation of racial animus used by a Virginia state judge to exclude African Americans from the jury selection process. Over a century later, in Buck v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 759, 776-777 (2017) this Court again denounced the use of racial animus; this time to condemn stereotype testimony from a defense expert that “black men” are predisposed to violence simply because they are “black.” The same year, in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S.Ct. 855, 867-870 (2017), this Court again condemned racial animus in the sexual assault trial of a Mexican man, when, during deliberations, a juror said that “nine out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls.”

1. Is it structural error and a denial of the Sixth Amendment right to “trial by an impartial jury” when the government expressly uses racial animus in a bribery trial by having an official government witness testify that people from India, like Petitioner Harshad Shah, are predisposed to bribery simply because they are Indian?

2. Given the injection of racial animus at trial, did the Ninth Circuit create a conflict with this Court’s precedent denying Petitioner due process and a fair trial when it misapplied plain error review to a predisposition jury instruction that “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”?1 1 [United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-736 (1993).]