Hunter Fussell v. Louisiana

The transfer of a child from juvenile court to a criminal court is a "critically important action." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). It exposes children to increased prison sentences, placement in an adult prison system, and criminal proceedings for which they are at a "significant disadvantage [.]" Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 78 (2010). Multiple courts have held that the Due Process Clause protects children from an arbitrary transfer. Others will give a child due process protections only if a state statute creates a liberty interest for the child to remain in juvenile court. Those courts, however, disagree over when a state creates a liberty interest. The decision below places Louisiana squarely on the most restrictive end of this range by allowing the automatic and irrevocable transfer of a 15-year-old child from the jurisdiction of a juvenile court to a criminal court without due process. The questions presented are:

1. Whether the Due Process Clause requires that a child receive an individualized hearing before being placed in criminal court to be tried as an adult.

2. Whether a state statute that places children in the exclusive jurisdiction of its juvenile courts creates a liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause.