William Johnson v. Paulding County, Georgia, et al.

This question presented is whether a State’s statute of limitations bridling the pursuit of regress for Unconstitutional and illegal pre­ trial imprisonment commences 48 hours after State imprisons a pre-trial detainee, or when the State releases that pre-trail detainee from jail. U.S.C.A. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Manuel v. City of Joliet. 137 S.Ct. 911 (2017). Manuel v. City of Joliet. Illinois. 903 F.3d 667 (2018). The Trial Court’s and Appeals Court’s ruling as to such, herein, is in sharp contrast with this Supreme Court’s precedent and the Seventh Circuit’s precedent concerning such. Manuel and Manuel, supra. Herein, the Eleventh Circuit contends that the limitations clock in Georgia is controlled by Georgia and starts ticking when Georgia says it does (currently 48 hours after pre-trial detention), while this Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have previously ruled that the clock does not start ticking until a detainee is released from jail and free from the State’s restraint so that the detainee is able and can sue his or her captors.

The question presented is whether the testimony within an affidavit of a verified complaint supporting facts asserted in the complaint should be considered as evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

This question presented is whether a county sheriff and his jailors can share their State’s cloak of Eleventh Amendment immunity for