Charles G. Kinney v. State Bar of California, et al.

By simultaneously dismissing 8 of Kinney's pending appeals, did these same 3 Judges on a Ninth Circuit panel abuse their discretion by covering-up acts by courts and the State Bar that violated Janus and NIFLA? Those courts used "vexatious litigant" and "puppet" labels, directlyinconsistent rulings, and threats of sanctions and disbarment (since attorneys must join the State Bar and pay dues via agency-based fees) to punish an attorney (who is now a pro se litigant) because he was unwilling to agree with Bar positions that subsidized private third parties and their political agenda as to how an attorney or pro se litigant must behave as to "professional speech" for his clients or himself; as to judges who do not adjudicate disputes but instead act as prosecutors of him under color of authority; and as to ongoing violations of law [e.g. violations of bankruptcy law in favor of debtor Clark who listed Kinney as a creditor; ADA violations near his Los Angeles house; CWA violations near his Laguna Beach house, and failures to provide "honest services"]. Did these courts abuse their discretion when acting as prosecutors under color of authority? Did this appeal (1 of 8) have "merit" because it challenged anti-competitive acts by a unified Bar which adversely affected interstate commerce? Did these courts abuse their discretion by ignoring repetitive and ongoing 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 violations of Kinney's federal civil rights?