Marquette Transportation Company, L.L.C. v. Kelvin Dunn

This Petition involves an injury claim by a Jones Act captain and raises questions on fitness for duty and his ultimate responsibility to implement safety and emergency procedures. A writ is necessary to resolve a significant conflict in the circuit courts related to the Primary Duty Doctrine, comparative fault and whether In Extremis may be used to bar these defenses in a Jones Act claim. Historically, U.S. courts have approached the issue as the Primary Duty Doctrine, but its application has become so varied between and within the circuit courts that its existence as a uniform standard is not known to the admiralty bar. In Jones Act cases, the standard of care by the seaman has uniformly been to use ordinary prudence under the circumstances to protect himself. Until this case, the In Extremis Doctrine had never been used to circumvent both the Primary Duty Doctrine and this standard of care. A writ is necessary to resolve this conflict with Supreme Court precedent and maintain uniformity in the Jones Act. The questions presented are:

1. Does the Primary Duty Doctrine still exist as a defense in Jones Act cases, and if so, does it only apply to a captain?

2. If the Primary Duty Doctrine exists, what evidence is necessary for the captain to show he is free from fault when he fails to handle a known hazard according to the safety and emergency protocols he is responsible for training the crew and enforcing?