Randy Holkesvig v. North Dakota

The U.S. Supreme Court set forth an objective standard that is applicable to this Writ of Certiorari that requires a recusal when the likelihood of bias on the part of the judge "is too high to be constitutionally tolerable." Caperton v. A.T Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). The U.S. Supreme Court recently stated on 6-9-16 in Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S.Ct. 1899 (2016) that "there is an impermissible of risk of bias that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when a judge was previously involved in the case as a prosecutor who participated in crucial decisions about the case." The U.S. Supreme Court left uncertainty open and has yet to decide whether bias is applicable to due process when District Court Judges and State Supreme Court Justices intentionally refuse to recuse, withdraw, disqualify and declined to address issues raised and retaliated by taking oppressive action and extraordinary measures to cover up and protect illicit acts committed by prosecutors and executives in a post-conviction relief application. They issued frivolous rulings, meritless oiders and retaliatory opinions in violation of the 1st, 5th and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and maliciously violated the Oath of Office. The question is; "Whether District Court Judges and State Supreme Court Justices can refuse to recuse in violation of Williams v. Pennsylvania, supra, and Caperton v. A.T Massey Coal Co., supra," by issuing biased,