Jamus Jacobs v. The Oath for Louisiana, Inc., et al.

This Court in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) declared specifically that the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not need a separate “opinion” privilege circumscribing the application of state defamation laws because there is sufficient protection already afforded in the existing constitutional doctrines. Statements that cannot reasonably be construed as stating actual facts about an individual are protected under the First Amendment. When a statement is sufficiently factual that it is capable of being proven true or false, then the statement is not shielded by the First Amendment and state laws proscribing defamation apply. The correct assessment is whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that a statement directs or implies something provable as false that is defamatory or attacks the reputation of an individual. If so, then the speaker is not protected from liability by the First Amendment. The constitutional questions presented herein are the following:

1. Whether in defamation suits, under the First Amendment a court must distinguish between false and defamatory statements of “fact” and false and defamatory statement of “opinion,” with the latter afforded protection from liability for defamation under the First Amendment.

2. Whether in defamation suits, under the First Amendment a party in litigation is shielded from